





Between January and April 2002, several hundred
Malawians died of starvation and hunger-related
diseases. As with all food crises, explanations fall
into two clusters: ‘trigger factors’ (livelihood shocks
and response failures), and ‘underlying causes’
(factors that raise vulnerability to livelihood
shocks). Also as is common with most famines, this
crisis can be explained as the complex product of a
combination of both ‘technical’ and ‘political’ issues.
2 What happened?
It is conventional in famine analysis to concentrate
on the most extreme outcome – ‘excess mortality’ –
as a measure of its severity. There are no official
statistics on hunger-related deaths in Malawi in
2002. However, the figure of 300–500 is widely
accepted as a lower estimate (Taifour 2002: 2),
while lists of the dead collected by civil society
groups suggest that a figure in the range of
1,000–3,000 may be more accurate.1 Even the
lower estimates make this famine the worst in
Malawi’s recorded history: the Nyasaland famine of
1949 resulted in approximately 200 deaths
(Vaughan 1987: 162).
Mortality peaked in February–March 2002, and
was concentrated among three typical ‘vulnerable
groups’: the very young, the elderly (members of
child-headed and elderly-headed households were
especially at risk), and the already ill. Unusually,
adult men and women also succumbed to
marasmus and death (FEWSNET 2002b). In parts
of Malawi the famine was known as ‘the swelling’,
because malnourished adults and children suffered
oedema that caused their faces and feet to swell up
before they died.
Rationing food consumption is an immediate and
universal response of the poor to livelihood shocks.
Malawians who are not self-sufficient in good
rainfall years already consume less food than they
need, because they are market-dependent and
rationing consumption makes limited food
supplies last longer (Peters 1996). In 2001/02,
dietary adaptation went far beyond ‘normal’
seasonal rationing. Abdominal illnesses and fatal
cases of food poisoning followed from
consumption of maize cobs and stalks, maize bran
mixed with sawdust, boiled mangoes, banana rootsIDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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or wild mushrooms. In February, hungry people
started consuming ‘green’ (unripe) maize. This
premature harvesting, later estimated at 8 per cent
of the maize crop, met immediate consumption
needs but undermined future food security. By
March, pumpkins were available, but they were
stunted because people had consumed the leaves.
By October 2001 people with livestock started
selling them to buy food, but the terms of trade fell
rapidly: maize prices rose due to excess demand,
livestock prices fell due to excess supply. In Mchinji
District, goats which sold for Malawi Kwacha
600–1,000 in November fetched MK150–500 in
February. Between February 2001 and February
2002 cattle prices fell from MK6,000–15,000 to
MK1,500–4,000 (Kamowa 2002). Chickens were
bartered for a plate of maize. When rural people
could not access food at affordable prices in their
communities, many moved to towns or migrated to
Zambia, where they survived on casual labour,
begging, or gleaning in grinding mills.
Another indicator of the severity of the food crisis
is the evidence of social breakdown and a rise in
antisocial behaviour. In many communities, social
structures for looking after vulnerable groups, such
as the elderly and orphans, collapsed. Some
parents reportedly abandoned their children or
even sold orphans in their care, being unable to
feed them (BBC 2002). Sex for food or cash
increased, inevitably raising rates of HIV/AIDS
transmission. Widespread thefts of food, livestock
and household items occurred, including unripe
maize from neighbours’ fields and gardens. This
provoked a violent response: people who were
caught stealing were hacked with machetes – many
had hands, fingers or ears amputated – or were
even killed.
Such behaviour is unprecedented in Malawi – at
least since the 1949 famine – and suggests that the
food crisis created extraordinary social tensions,
accelerating a process of profoundly negative
sociocultural change, which started, according to
some, with the economic liberalisation and political
transition of the 1980s and 1990s. Crudely,
liberalisation has been associated with deepening
poverty and rising inequality, while the shift from
repressive authoritarian rule to multi-party
democracy has been associated with a breakdown
of law and order and spiralling levels of crime and
violence (Evans 1997; Mataya et al. 1998).2
3 Triggers
According to Sen’s ‘entitlement approach’ to famine
analysis, famines follow from failures in
production-based, trade-based, labour-based and
transfer-based entitlements to food (Sen 1981).
This framework is useful for analysing the Malawi
food crisis of 2001/02, which followed a reduced
maize harvest (production failure), import
bottlenecks (trade failure), poverty and limited
employment opportunities (labour constraints),
and late delivery of food aid (transfer failures).
3.1 Food production shock
The immediate trigger for the food crisis was
abnormal rainfall – localised flooding and
waterlogging of fields – during February and
March 2001, which reduced national maize
production by 32 per cent, from a record high of
2.5 million metric tons in the 1999/2000 season to
1.7 million metric tons in 2000/01. The Famine
Early Warning System (FEWSNET) predicted a
maize shortfall of 273,000 metric tons, but since
the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation estimated
that roots and tubers production (cassava,
potatoes) was ‘high’, FEWSNET (2001) predicted
that total food availability would be more than
adequate, with a surplus over consumption needs
(in maize-equivalent terms) of 437,775 metric
tons. Also, the National Food Reserve Agency
(NFRA) held over 60,000 metric tons in maize
stocks at the start of the new consumption year, in
April 2001.
Information constraints – information that was
plain wrong, or concealed, or ignored –
contributed to the food crisis in several ways.
Misleading production estimates for the 2000/01
agricultural season resulted in unfounded
complacency about the food availability situation,
and contributed to slow response by both public
and private actors. First, maize production
estimates were revised downwards three times
during the season, which created a misguided
belief, as late as April 2001, that the maize harvest
would be adequate for national consumption
needs. Second, even after the harvest was in and
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the ‘maize gap’ was known, overestimates of roots
and tubers production – caused by methodological
problems but compounded by Ministry of
Agriculture efforts to demonstrate the success of its
crop diversification strategy away from white maize
– generated expectations that the maize shortfall
would be covered by cassava and potatoes. As late
as January 2002, the Famine Early Warning System
was insisting that ‘Malawi has a national food
surplus in 2001/02’ (FEWSNET 2002b). This false
optimism fatally delayed predictions of an
emergency. When evidence emerged in late 2001 of
rising maize prices and shortages of food in village
markets, the government, donors and FEWSNET
explained this in terms of Malawians’ ‘inflexible
eating habits’ and ‘strong consumption preference
for maize’. These statements reflect failures of
information: in fact, many Malawians migrated
from maize-growing to cassava-growing areas in
their desperate search for food.
Information about the impending food crisis was
available as early as August 2001, when NGOs
working at village-level reported abnormal maize
price rises and warned of rapidly declining food
security, but the credibility of this information was
questioned and the signals were ignored. In
October, Save the Children (UK) published a
report which revealed alarming indicators of stress
in Mchinji District: maize prices had risen by 340
per cent since January and 40 per cent of
households were already out of food (Sawdon
2001). In November, Save the Children made a
public presentation in Lilongwe, calling for
immediate intervention. But government and
donors remained sceptical, arguing that according
to official statistics there was no food availability
problem, and this recommendation was rejected.
In December 2001 and February 2002, Save the
Children commissioned nutrition surveys in two
districts, which found an alarming escalation in
global malnutrition rates for Salima, from 9.3 per
cent to 19.0 per cent (Taifour 2002). This provided
the first ‘hard evidence’ that donors found credible,
and it provoked an immediate, albeit belated,
response.
Among civil society organisations, the Malawi
Economic Justice Network (MEJN) – an umbrella
grouping of 45 civil society organisations and
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Box 1: The role of the media as an ‘Early Warning System’ in Malawi
In February and March 2002, the international media broadcast sensational reports from Malawi, a
country that generally receives negligible attention from the world’s media. (Headlines from BBC News
included: ‘Famine stalks Southern Africa’, 19 February; ‘Malawi declares famine emergency’, 27
February; ‘Spectre of starvation in Malawi’, 6 March.) Media coverage focused on two aspects of the
crisis: graphic evidence of malnutrition and hunger, and lurid stories of people being killed or mutilated
by their neighbours for stealing food.
‘Hunger breeds desperation in Malawi’ (Boston Globe, 28 April 2002)
It was the most expensive corn James Black had ever eaten. When workers on a
neighbouring farm accused him of stealing three cobs in early March, they attacked the
tobacco worker. First they bound him, then they beat him bloody and finally, they sliced
both his ears with a razor. Before abandoning Black, they stuffed one ear in his pocket. Asked
to explain such brutality, Black said simply: “It is the hunger.”
Since the 1980s, academics have argued that a ‘free and campaigning press’ acts as a ‘famine early
warning system’, alerting national governments and international donors to impending food crises and
thereby ensuring that resources are mobilised to prevent a potential disaster sliding into a mass
mortality tragedy. The case of Malawi in 2002 reveals the limitations of this argument. The media is a
late indicator of distress, not an early warning. Journalists and television crews arrived in Malawi like
spectators at a car crash: to observe the tragedy, not to prevent it.
NGOs concerned with ‘economic governance’ in
Malawi – was instrumental since late 2001 in
mobilising activist groups, media campaigning and
pressurising the government to declare a famine.
Religious groups affiliated to MEJN – such as the
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace –
collected statistics on starvation deaths, which were
presented to the government and disseminated to
the local and international press. Despite their close
contacts with affected communities, the data
provided by MEJN and these religious organisations
was dismissed. President Muluzi at first denied the
crisis, then finally declared a State of Disaster –
though not a ‘famine’ – on 27 February 2002.
Moreover, the international media did not react to
warnings of impending tragedy until the crisis was
full-blown (see Box 1).
So, information about the food shortage was
publicised in good time for effective relief
interventions to have been launched. However,
since this information came not through ‘official’
sources, but rather through traditional leaders,
church groups and other civil society organisations,
the government and donors failed to act on these
signals until it was too late. An important lesson is
that information derived from ‘informal’ sources
such as NGOs should be validated rather than
dismissed: because they work at community-level,
NGOs can act as useful early warning systems.
3.2 Strategic grain reserve
mismanagement
The motto of the National Food Reserve Agency
(NFRA) – ‘ADEQUATE RESERVES FOR MALAWI’ –
reveals its mandate: to maintain adequate buffer
stocks to protect Malawians against fluctuations in
food production, availability and prices. Yet during
2001 the NFRA sold all of the Strategic Grain
Reserve (SGR), and some months later, people were
dying of hunger. How could this have happened?
The NFRA was established as an independent trust
in July 1999. Previously the grain reserve was
managed by ADMARC, the agricultural marketing
parastatal. But the donors argued that the SGR
should be run independently, on a cost-recovery
basis, and for this reason the NFRA was not
capitalised. Instead, the NFRA took a commercial
loan and purchased 167,000 metric tons of maize,
following the bumper harvest of 1999. During
2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
advised the NFRA to sell some of the SGR to
service its debt, but another bumper harvest
depressed maize prices and made it impossible to
sell except at heavy losses.
The IMF and World Bank were increasingly
concerned that the size of the SGR was ‘excessive’,
that NFRA operations risked distorting the market,
and that holding this level of reserve was fiscally
unsustainable. By early 2001, the maize in the SGR
was almost two years old and badly needed
replenishment, while the NFRA remained heavily
in debt. The IMF therefore advised the NFRA to
export SGR grain (rather than ‘dump’ it on local
markets, which would depress prices further and
undermine producer and trader incentives), and to
replenish it to a much lower level, to release funds
to repay the NFRA loan. Accordingly, 35,000
metric tons of SGR maize was sold to Kenya and
Mozambique in April–May 2001. This
controversial decision was subsequently blamed as
a major contributory factor to the food crisis.
The IMF admits that the policy advice it gave to the
government in 2001 was based on ‘wrong
information’ about crop production. ‘We strongly
advised the government to reduce the level of the
grain reserve to between 30,000 and 60,000 tons,
on cost-effectiveness grounds, but not to sell it all
off.’ Sales of SGR stock should have been
replenished through local purchases after the 2001
harvest. ‘When the decision was taken to export
NFRA maize to Kenya and Mozambique, this was
the correct decision based on information available
at the time. An average harvest was forecast, the
maize stock was old, and someone was willing to
buy it. The advice would have been correct if the
information was correct.’3
As noted above, harvest forecasts were repeatedly
revised downwards during the first half of 2001,
when most of the grain reserve was sold. The result
was a steady rundown of the SGR, from a
highpoint of 175,000 metric tons in August 2000
to virtually zero stocks one year later (see Figure 1).
Because of lack of local surpluses to purchase and
delayed maize imports (shown on the right of
Figure 1), Malawi was effectively without any
public stocks of food for three months.
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An unresolved question is what happened to some
60,000 metric tons of SGR maize that was not
officially exported in 2001. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that local politicians and well-connected
businesspeople profiteered by buying maize
cheaply from the SGR early in 2001 and reselling it
when the government trebled the price of NFRA
maize in November, earning excessive profits. The
allegation is that wealthy and influential people who
knew about the coming food price hike bought
grain from the SGR and withdrew it from the
market, creating an artificial shortage that
exacerbated the crisis. As seen below, the
controversy over this ‘missing maize’ became
another reason for the slow response of donors.
3.3 Import bottlenecks
After the final-round crop production estimates in
June 2001 projected a maize deficit of 273,000
tons, the Government of Malawi announced that it
would cover much of the shortfall by buying and
reselling 220,000 tons of maize. In past years,
ADMARC interventions in the market served to
stabilise food supplies and prices. Many Malawians
believe that this was an important positive factor
during the drought of 1991/92, when despite a
more severe production shock than in 2001,
ADMARC retained adequate supplies of cereals in
its markets at affordable prices. In 2001, however,
the local purchase programme failed, mainly
because ADMARC entered the market late – in July,
after private traders had bought up what little
maize farmers were willing and able to sell – and
found few sellers at its initial purchase offer of
MK3/kg, or even when this was raised to MK12/kg.
Accordingly, the Cabinet Committee on the
Economy directed the National Food Reserve
Agency (NFRA) to import maize. In August 2001
the NFRA borrowed US$33 million at 4 per cent
interest from a South African bank, and ordered
150,000 metric tons of white maize from South
Africa. Because of delays in the import programme,
price rises and adverse exchange rate movements,
the NFRA eventually purchased 134,000 tons at an
average price of US$245 per ton. Prices started at
US$220 but rose to US$265 per ton, as other food
deficit countries in the region also turned to South
Africa to import maize.
All the maize purchased from South Africa should
have been delivered between October and
December, at a rate of 50,000 tons per month. If
this maize had arrived by December 2001, the
crisis might have been averted, but in reality these
imports arrived at a rate of only 15,000 tons per
month, so that by April 2002 only 94,000 metric
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Figure 1: Malawi maize stocks and imports, 2000–2002
tons had physically arrived in Malawi. The import
programme was hampered by competition for
scarce regional maize supplies from neighbouring
food deficit countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe,
and by logistical constraints, as the floods that
caused harvest failures also washed away feeder
roads, bridges and railway lines, disrupting the
movement of food both into and inside Malawi.4
In most years, retail maize prices in Malawi are
lowest after harvest in June/July, and rise by 50–100
per cent over the next six months, peaking during
the lean period between December and February. In
2001, failed harvests and slow imports led to retail
(and ADMARC) prices trebling or quadrupling in
some places, a case in point being Lizulu market,
where prices rose from MK8.80/kg in June to
MK25/kg in December. By early 2002, the retail
price in some village markets had reached MK40 or
more. At that time, the agricultural labour (ganyu)
wage rate averaged MK20/day – though finding
casual employment was increasingly difficult.
In an effort to protect household food security, the
government attempted to control the price and
distribution of maize, but these efforts had limited
success. First, a pan-territorial price of
MK17.40/kg was imposed on imported maize
purchased (at its landed cost of MK14.50/kg) from
the NFRA – a break-even price including handling
costs. Unfortunately, this uniform price policy
discouraged traders from supplying markets with
high transport costs, so the bulk of imported maize
remained in Malawi’s urban centres, and had
limited penetration to the isolated rural
communities where hunger was most severe. Next,
because of scarce supplies, ADMARC maize sales
were rationed to 25 kg, and later 10 kg, per person.
The coexistence of a subsidised public distribution
channel alongside a free market in the staple grain
created opportunities for rent-seeking that many
traders exploited, by buying NFRA maize and
reselling it well above the ceiling price. In
December 2001, the government banned private
traders from purchasing maize from the NFRA, and
made ADMARC the sole purchaser. But traders
circumvented this ban by hiring local people to
buy maize for them, thereby stockpiling grain
which they resold for high profits. So the
government’s efforts to stabilise prices were
undermined, and much of the maize supplied by
NFRA was sold on the open market at scarcity
prices.
Finally – against the wishes of many donors – the
government contracted ADMARC to open
hundreds of ‘social markets’, to ensure that food
supplies reached rural communities at affordable
prices. (This food security function had been
undertaken by ADMARC in the past, before its
activities were partially commercialised under
structural adjustment conditionalities, and
hundreds of ‘unprofitable’ rural depots were closed
(Devereux 1999).) Poor Malawians therefore faced
two unsatisfactory options for accessing food:
ADMARC markets where prices were relatively low
but supplies were erratic and purchases were
rationed, or commercial markets where supplies
were sometimes better – partly because of
diversion of publicly imported maize – but prices
were unaffordably high.
3.4 Slow donor response
The Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation called a
meeting of Malawi’s donor partners in August 2001
to announce that a large food deficit was looming,
and to mobilise assistance. But the donors were
sceptical, and as a result their intervention came
too late to prevent starvation deaths in early 2002.
Why?
One possible explanation is that the donors were
genuinely unaware of the severity of the impending
crisis because they were misled by limited and
inaccurate information – exaggerated cassava
production estimates, covert Strategic Grain
Reserve sales – and their belief that the import
programme would cover most of Malawi’s food
gap. Clearly, if cassava production, SGR stocks and
maize imports had been available at their expected
levels, the food gap would have been closed.
An alternative explanation is that the donors were
slow to intervene in the food crisis because their
relations with the Government of Malawi were
strained at this critical time. The origins of this
deteriorating relationship go back to July 2000,
when the parliamentary Public Accounts
Committee published a highly critical report on
government corruption. Donors also complained
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about ‘economic mismanagement’ and ‘bad
governance’. In October 2000, for instance, the
British High Commissioner publicly rebuked the
Government of Malawi and threatened to withhold
aid unless corruption was tackled. In November
2001, several bilateral and multilateral donors –
including the UK (DFID), the EU and the US
(USAID) – suspended their aid programmes, the
IMF withheld balance of payments support, while
Denmark closed its development programmes and
withdrew from Malawi entirely. Other issues of
contention at the time included the running down
of the SGR, the ruling party’s campaign to change
the Constitution to allow President Muluzi to run
for a third term in 2004,5 and political violence by
government supporters against its opponents.
When it emerged that the Strategic Grain Reserve
was empty and the government was requesting food
aid, some donors demanded an explanation –
which was never provided – about the missing
60,000 metric tons, reasoning that if it had been
sold locally, then the food crisis was artificial and
this maize should be released onto the market.
USAID claimed that the export of some SGR grain
(on IMF advice, to Kenya and Mozambique) tied
their hands: ‘If a government exports food, the
United States has prohibitions on bringing in
emergency food in the same year.’ Only after the
media started reporting starvation deaths early in
2002 did the donors back down and offer food aid
unconditionally, which at least helped prevent an
even larger tragedy.
Although the donors committed themselves to
substantial pledges of emergency assistance for the
2002/03 agricultural year, relations did not improve
during or after the food crisis. In May 2002, the
IMF announced that it was delaying disbursement
of US$47 million in loans to Malawi, primarily
because the Government of Malawi had overshot its
fiscal spending target by 7 per cent of GDP.
Lack of good governance has resulted in a
misallocation of resources, increased the cost of
doing business, created a general distrust in
public sector activities, and weakened civil
service morale. There is a need to recognise that
corruption and weak governance in tandem
with bad policies make financial aid ineffective,
even counter-productive (IMF 2002).
At the same time, the IMF blamed government
policies for creating famine conditions in Malawi
earlier in the year: ‘Government interventions in
the past may have contributed to the current crisis
by eroding initiatives for producing food.’ The IMF
also implied that ADMARC and NFRA activities to
minimise famine mortality were unjustified and
‘unproductive’.6 The IMF, USAID and World Bank
argued that the ‘agreed’ timetable for full
commercialisation of ADMARC by end-2002
should continue regardless of the food crisis,
whereas government and many NGOs believe that
ADMARC’s ‘social market’ function is vital for
safeguarding basic food security and should be
retained, even if this requires subsidisation.
4 Vulnerability
In 1991/92, a severe drought throughout southern
Africa reduced maize production in Malawi to
800,000 metric tons – less than half the 2001 harvest
– but produced nothing like as tragic impacts.7 Why
not? Perhaps because the context of the two
emergencies was entirely different. Most crucially, the
food crisis of 2001/02 was the culmination of an
ongoing process of steadily increasing vulnerability of
Malawi’s predominantly poor (65 per cent) and rural
(85 per cent) population.
Low and declining agricultural productivity is
perhaps the fundamental source of chronic poverty
and food insecurity in rural Malawi. Soil fertility in
Malawi fell during the 1990s, reducing crop yields
at the same time as escalating fertiliser prices,
shrinking farm sizes, and the spread of HIV/AIDS,8
all undermined household efforts to achieve food
production self-sufficiency.
Until the early 1990s the Government of Malawi,
like most of its neighbours, maintained a complex
set of institutions and policies that supported the
production and distribution of food staples.
Though costly and inefficient, institutions like
ADMARC and policies like fertiliser subsidies and
maize price stabilisation contributed significantly
to household food security. Structural adjustment
reforms – including the Fertiliser Subsidy Removal
Programme, the collapse of the Smallholder
Agricultural Credit Association, and the
commercialisation of ADMARC – systematically
dismantled these institutions and abolished these
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policies. To date, the anticipated benefits of
agricultural liberalisation, including the emergence
of an efficient and competitive private sector, have
not materialised. Given Malawi’s extreme poverty,
weak transport infrastructure and thin network of
traders, it is highly unlikely that the private sector
can effectively replace the public institutions that
have been undermined in the pursuit of
liberalisation, at least in the foreseeable future.
Two sets of vulnerability factors intersected in
converting the crop failure of 2001 into the famine
of 2002: unsustainable livelihoods and weak
institutions. If the old model of heavy state
interventionism in food production and
distribution was built on ‘unsustainable’ subsidies
and ‘inefficient’ institutions, it was at least more
effective at protecting household food security than
the ‘blueprint’ application of Washington
Consensus ideology, which deliberately
undermined these pillars of food security and
exposed Malawi’s poor to the full consequences of
production, market and relief failures.
There can be no question of resuscitating Malawi’s
parastatals and reintroducing untargeted input or
consumers subsidies: for one thing, it is extremely
difficult to implement subsidies in a liberalised
economy with porous borders. Nonetheless, the
consequences of state withdrawal from food
security provisioning in a context of mass poverty,
market failure and lack of social protection were all
too predictable, and have now been realised – these
policies have delivered chronic vulnerability and
the persistent threat of famine. A new development
model is needed for Malawi, one which at the very
least guarantees basic food security – access to
adequate food at affordable prices – to all
Malawians at all times.
5 Conclusion
Superficially, the Malawi famine of 2002 might
appear to have all the characteristics of old-style
‘drought famines’: a crop failure triggered by
climatic variability in a rain-fed agricultural system,
‘exchange entitlement failures’ as food prices
spiralled and livestock prices collapsed, weak
government institutions, and slow donor response.
Yet there are also elements that classify this as a
‘new famine’, including:
l high levels of HIV-prevalence and a growing
threat of what Alex de Waal (in this Bulletin)
labels ‘AIDS-Related National Crises’;
l the imposition of economic liberalisation
policies that have undermined the institutional
capacity of the state to deliver food security to
its citizens;
l powerful Western donors engaged in fractious
relationships with client governments at critical
moments for national food security;
l the ‘new neo-Malthusianism’ of a growing
population characterised by high dependency
ratios and confined to low-input, low-output
agriculture, with few alternative employment
opportunities and a desperate need for
structural transformation of the rural economy.
This scenario is not unique to Malawi – it is found
also in highland Ethiopia and the Great Lakes
region, for instance – but it may be a recipe for a
new generation of famines, of which Malawi in
2002 is only the first.
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Notes
* This article is based on a report commissioned by
ActionAid-Malawi for the Civil Society Agriculture
Network (Devereux 2002). It draws on interviews
conducted with the Government of Malawi, NGOs,
faith-based and rights organisations, donors,
academics, and private traders.
1. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Malawi,
pers. comm.
2. Two statements made in focus group discussions by
elderly Malawians articulate this view succinctly:
‘Before, everyone was for each other. Now everyone
is for himself, and only God is for everyone’ and
‘Democracy is anarchy! We have moved from too
little freedom to too much freedom’ (Devereux
1999).
3. Quotations come from an interview conducted with
the IMF in Malawi, May 2002.
4. Additionally, ‘bad luck’ problems affected road, rail
and sea routes. (1) Truckers who were already
engaged in bringing fertilisers and later Christmas
goods into Malawi had little spare capacity for maize
imports. (2) A train derailment on the South Africa –
Zimbabwe border disrupted rail traffic for several
weeks, while floods also damaged the railway line
along the ‘Nacala corridor’ from Mozambique. (3)
The Mozambican ports of Nacala and Beira faced
capacity constraints, which delayed shipments of
grain destined for Malawi.
5. On 4 July 2002, this proposed constitutional
amendment was rejected by the Malawi Parliament.
6. ‘Government interventions in the food and other
agricultural markets ultimately led to the National
Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) and the Agricultural
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC)
taking heavy recourse to budgetary financing,
crowding out more productive spending’ (IMF 2002).
7. See Eldridge, in this Bulletin, for an analysis of the
1991/92 drought emergency.
8. HIV-prevalence in Malawi is estimated at 20 per cent
of the national population (National AIDS
Commission 2001). By 1999, AIDS had reduced
estimated life expectancy at birth from 51 to 37 years
– one of the lowest in the world (Haacker 2002: 4).
Mortality due to AIDS affects working age adults
disproportionately. AIDS has created new categories
of ‘demographically vulnerable’ groups: households
lacking adult labour, elderly-headed and child-
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